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Conceptualizing “Dark Platforms”. Covid-19-Related
Conspiracy Theories on 8kun and Gab
Jing Zeng and Mike S. Sch€afer
Department of Communication and Media Research, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
ABSTRACT
This study investigates how COVID-19-related content, especially
conspiracy theories, is communicated on “dark platforms” —
digital platforms that are less regulated and moderated, hence
can be used for hosting content and content creators that may
not be tolerated by their more mainstream counterparts. The
objective of this study is two-fold: First, it introduces the concept
of dark platforms, which differ from their mainstream counter-
parts in terms of content governance, user-base and technological
infrastructure. Second, using 8kun and Gab as examples, this
study investigates how the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has
been communicated on dark platforms, with a focus on conspir-
acy theories. Over 60,000 COVID-19-related posts were studied to
identify the most prominent conspiracy theories, their themes,
and the actors who promoted them, as well as the broader infor-
mation ecosystem through network analysis. While pressure on
social media to deplatform conspiracy theorists continues to
grow, we argue that more research needs to be done to critically
investigate the impacts of further marginalizing such groups. To
this end, the concept of dark platform as can serve as a heuristic






The COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by a corresponding “infodemic”, which
has permeated the online realm with a plethora of conspiracy theories and misinforma-
tion (United Nations 2020). This study investigates how COVID-19-related content, espe-
cially conspiracy theories, is communicated on “dark platforms”. We define dark
platforms as digital platforms that are less regulated and moderated, hence can be used
for hosting content and content creators that may not be tolerated by their more main-
stream counterparts. As we will discuss in more detail in the next section, dark platforms
have three characteristics: content liberation, exile congregation, and infrastructure ostraci-
zation. Examples of such platforms include established imageboards (e.g. 4chan and
8kun) and emerging new social media sites (e.g. Parler and Gab).
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In this study we define conspiracy theories as proposed explanations of events or
practices that make reference to the secret machinations of powerful individuals or
institutions (Goertzel 1994; Keeley 1999; Uscinski 2019). Conspiracy theories used to be
considered as anomalies, but over time they have become increasinglyly normalized in
public discourse and media (Aupers 2012; Uscinski 2019). During the pandemic, for
instance, conspiracy theories claiming that the COVID-19 virus was bio-engineered
were utilized by both the Trump administration and Chinese politicians as a discursive
weapon to attack one another (Zeng and Chan 2021).
Factors contributing to the prevalence of conspiracy theories are manifold, and this
study is particularly interested in the role played by digital platforms where conspiracy
theorists congregate. As demonstrated by a fast-growing body of scholarship, social media
is playing an increasingly large role in amplifying the visibility of conspiracy theories (e.g.
Broniatowski et al. 2018; Bruns, Harrington, and Hurcombe 2020; Marwick and Lewis
2017). In response to growing pressure from the public and regulators, major social media
platforms have begun to systematically crack down on conspiracy theory-related content
and influential conspiracy theory personalities (Mahl, Zeng, and Sch€afer 2021). This trend
is turning dark platforms into the new venues for conspiracy theorists to congregate. Dark
platforms offer more freedom and largely abstain from content moderation, which makes
them an attractive refuge for conspiracy theorists and other de-platformed individuals.
Despite the fast-growing influence of and threats posed by dark platforms, they remain
largely under-researched. This study seeks to fill this void through introducing the concept
of dark platforms, and through investigating how they are used to communicate and the-
orizing conspiratorial narratives about COVID-19.
Dark Platforms
Defining Characteristics
Dark platforms share basic functionalities with their mainstream counterparts. For
instance, they provide the communicative architecture that allows users to create, dis-
tribute, and engage with content in various modalities. To discuss dark platforms’ dis-
tinctive characteristics, we adapt the framework proposed by Nieborg and Poell (2018)
and focus on three dimensions of platforms: governance, user, and technological infra-
structure. Following this logic, the key characteristics of dark platforms can be sum-
marized as content liberation, exile congregation, and infrastructure ostracization.
To begin with, dark platforms practice, and often celebrate, content liberation. In com-
parison to mainstream platforms, communication on dark platforms is less regulated.
Unlike prominent technology companies, who are increasingly under pressure to expand
their policies of content moderation (Gillespie 2018), dark platforms have gained popularity
in recent years by promoting their image as “defenders of the free flow of information”
(del Castillo 2018). From conspiracy theories to alt-right commentary, from coordinated
trolling to racist hate-speech, toxic information is widely promulgated on dark platforms
(Marwick and Lewis 2017; Thibault 2016; Tuters, Jokubauskait _e, and Bach 2018).
Dark platforms offer exile congregation. As major technology companies continue to
crack down on perceived harmful content and its creators, expelled “digital refugees”
tend to migrate to the dark corners of the Internet. It is important to point out that
2 J. ZENG AND M. S. SCHÄFER
because platform governance varies depending upon the social contexts, who consti-
tutes a digital refugee also varies. Although platform regulation in Western democra-
cies has now focussed on deceptive information, hate speech, and far-right content,
authoritarian regimes often coerce online platforms to redact users who disagree with
or criticize the ruling power (Zeng, Chan, and Fu 2017).
Dark platforms are also characterized by infrastructure ostracization. For example,
far-right activists and conspiracy theorists have become a regular target for deplat-
formisation, which refers to the action taken by technology companies to prohibit
controversial entities from accessing certain services (Rogers 2020; del Castillo 2018).
Google and Apple, for example, deplatformed far-right radio host Alex Jones’ Infowars
app by removing it from their app stores; Visa and PayPal deplatformed the controver-
sial microblogging service, Gab, so it can no longer receive money through their serv-
ices. This trend has fostered the emergence of a parallel darker ecosystem of content
distribution and monetization. For instance, demonetized video content creators
migrate to YouTube’s dark equivalent, BitChute, where they can receive “tips” from
their viewers directly. Similarly, instead of using Visa or PayPal to receive money, Gab
lets its users donate with Bitcoin.
The concept of dark platforms provides a heuristic device for researching digital
platforms that are often marginalized in social media scholarship. To effectively apply
this concept, some conceptual clarification over our usage of “dark” is necessary.
First, “dark” is not inaccessible. Dark platforms are different to the “dark web”.
Content on the dark web is typically accessed anonymously through crypto-networks.
In contrast, dark platforms belong to the clear web—the publicly accessible internet.
Another concept related to dark platforms is the “dark social” (Al-Rawi 2019; Swart,
Peters, and Broersma 2018), which is mostly used to study information exchange in
semi-private space (e.g. private Facebook or WhatsApp groups) and encrypted mes-
saging communication (e.g. Telegram). Dark platforms discussed in this article go
beyond private/semi-private communication locales and include publicly accessible
sites. Wherein both the “dark web” and the “dark social” emphasize the various
degrees of inaccessibility caused by technological architecture, our conceptualization
of “dark” underlines under-visibility or intended “silosociality” (Abidin 2021, 4).
Second, there are different shades of “dark”. To introduce the concept of dark plat-
forms is to move away from a dichotomous differentiation of mainstream and alterna-
tive platforms. The growing impact of dark platforms makes such dichotomy
particularly problematic, as it downplays the significance of the latter. In contrast, the
concept of dark platforms emphasizes that the degree to which a platform is alterna-
tive or secretive—its shade of darkness—is contextual and contingent. For instance,
although YouTube and Twitter are perceived as being mainstream platforms in most
countries, they could be on the “dark” spectrum in other countries (e.g. China where
these platforms are officially banned).
Third, “dark” is not a normative term. Despite the negative connotation sometimes
associated with “dark”, our use of the term is not pejorative. We use it metaphorically
to depict the arcane and obscure nature of certain platforms and their disarticulation
from regulatory systems. While in this article we discussed exclusively virulent forms of
information, the concept of dark platforms can also be applied to researching
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communication that has positive impacts. For instance, under authoritative regimes
where censorship of dissenting opinions is vigorous, dark platforms may operate out-
side the spotlight of governmental censorship; thus, they might function as an arena
to protect dissenting voices.
Dark Participation in Conspiracy Theorising
New communication technologies, especially social media, have boosted the public’s
willingness and ability to question authoritative truth claims, and fostered the emer-
gence of participatory sense-making. Although earlier studies of participatory culture
have highlighted its progressive and democratizing potential, more recent scholarship
has shifted its focus to the disruptive effects of citizen participation on digital platforms
(De Vreese 2021, Westlund 2021). For instance, communication scholar Thorsten Quandt
(2018) introduced the concept of dark participation, a critique of the idealization of citi-
zen participation and a call for avoiding “one-sidedness both in the early debate on par-
ticipation and its much darker counterpart as of recently” (Quandt 2021, 86). Using
examples such as trolling, hate speech, and strategic disinformation, Quandt (2018, 40)
captured the “negative, selfish or even deeply sinister” aspects of citizen participation.
The development and spread of conspiracy theories in the digital space is another
form of dark participation. Conspiracy theories are a sense-making process that
emerge in the context of uncertainty and perceived risks (Van Prooijen and Jostmann
2013). The affordances of new communication technologies, such as dark platforms,
allow individuals believing the same theories to participate in crowd-sourcing
“evidence”, as well as in further “converting” more believers. Like other forms of dark
participation, to develop and propagate conspiracy theories can also be highly disrup-
tive. Conspiratorial narratives promote counter-epistemic positions that reject the jour-
nalistic and scientific paradigm (Mede and Sch€afer 2020). In the context of a
pandemic, they can hamper public health responses and lead to unlawful conduct.
For instance, in 2020, conspiracy claims linked the COVID-19 virus to the nefarious
machinations of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Gates Foundation flour-
ished on 8kun and 4chan, and eventually inspired certain members of these image-
boards to hack and release of thousands of credentials (e.g. emails and passwords)
from the two organizations (Mekhennet and Timberg 2020).
The damaging consequence of online conspiracy theories makes it vital to empiric-
ally interrogate the role of different digital platforms. While many studies have dis-
cussed the impacts of major social media in propagating COVID-19-related conspiracy
theories (e.g. Ahmed et al. 2020; Bruns, Harrington, and Hurcombe 2020; Cinelli,
Quattrociocchi, and Galeazzi 2020; Yang et al. 2020), little is known about the preva-
lent conspiracy theories and their propagators on dark platforms. To answer these
questions, this study asks:
RQ1: How prevalent are different COVID-19-related conspiracy theories on dark platforms?
RQ2: Who are the most influential actors propagating COVID-19-related information,
including conspiracy theories?
In a recent commentary on the concept of dark participation, Westlund (2021,
212) pointed out that the prevalence of dark participation should be examined as
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the interplay of activities between diverse actors, technological actants, and audi-
ence. As implied by this remark, studies of dark participation should acknowledge,
as well as be situated in, a complex media ecosystem. In the context of the current
study, it requires investigating how dark platforms are situated in the wider infor-
mation system and how cross-platform information curation and sensemaking takes
place. Dark platforms are often depicted as isolated venues engaging in antisocial
activities, and they are given labels, such as “the underbelly of the Internet”
(Chandrasekharan et al. 2017, 3178) or the “peripheries of the Web” (Thibault 2016,
23). Rather than solely focussing on their deviance and distance, we are also inter-
ested in understanding how dark platforms operate as part of the wider communi-
cation ecology. Using the example of COVID-19-related conspiracy theories, the
third research question we asked is:




For this case study on COVID-19 conspiracy theories, we used 8kun and Gab as exam-
ples of dark platforms. These two platforms were selected because they embody the
three characteristics of dark platforms we discussed in the previous section, and
because they are both closely linked to conspiracy theories.
8kun is an anonymous imageboard previously known as 8chan. 8chan had long
been known for its far-right extremist, racist and violence-endorsing content, and its
links to multiple mass shootings led to its removal from the clear web in August
2019 (Roose 2019). Three months later, through a Russian hosting company, 8chan
re-emerged under the new name: 8kun. One primary difference between 8chan and
8kun is the latter’s removal of the most notorious “/pol/” board, which was known
to host some of the most toxic content on the site. Instead, as 8chan creator
Fredrick Brennan noted, 8kun now focuses strongly on its “/qresearch/” board dedi-
cated to QAnon conspiracy theory (Glaser 2019). QAnon is a meta-conspiratorial nar-
rative that knits together a wide range of conspiracy theories (Zuckerman 2019, 2).
The eponymous “Q” is an anonymous alleged political insider who claims that
Donald Trump is battling a cabal of shadow groups including US Democratic Party,
business tycoons and Hollywood celebrities who secretly rule the world and engage
in activities such as satanic rituals, paedophilia and cannibalism. Through 8chan and
8kun, “Q” provides his followers—the Anons—with clues about how to fight
this cabal.
The second dark platform we analysed, Gab, is a micro-blogging service launched
in 2016 as an alternative to Twitter. A self-described “home of free speech online”
(Gab 2020a), the platform has accumulated over 1,157,000 registered accounts and 3.7
million monthly visitors from around the world (Gab 2020b). Similar to 8kun, conspir-
acy theories, hate speech, and alt-right content flourish on the site (Kalmar, Stevens,
and Worby 2018; Zannettou et al. 2017; Zhou et al. 2019).
DIGITAL JOURNALISM 5
Data Collection
As discussed in the previous section, “/qresearch/” is the most conspiracy theory-rich
board on 8kun and, therefore, the most relevant to our interests. Consequently, our
data collection on 8kun focussed exclusively on this board. COVID-19-related content
from this board was retrieved through QResear: a search tool for 8kun’s “/qresearch/”
board. With the keyword, “covid”, we collected 30,552 posts that were published
between February and July 2020.
Even though Gab has application programming interfaces (APIs) through which reg-
istered users can collect posts using account names and hashtags, there is no official
documentation for these APIs (Kalmar, Stevens, and Worby 2018; Zannettou et al.
2017). In this study, we developed scripts to send API requests based on garc, a
Python library for collecting JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) data from Gab.com
(Stevens 2020). We conducted a hashtag-search to retrieve metadata of Gab posts, or
gabs. The terms we used for our data collection include “#covid19”, “#covid_19”,
“#coronavirus”, “#chinavirus”, “#chinesevirus” and “#wuhanvirus”1. In total, 30,084 gabs
published between January and July 2020 were collected.
Data Analysis
Content Analysis
It is methodologically challenging to identify conspiracy theories from 8kun and Gab
posts. On the one hand, many posts do not share conspiracy theories directly in the
post; rather, they point to external articles or videos. This requires researchers to
manually inspect the cited sources to make sense of the post. On the other hand, the
intrinsic epistemological complexity of conspiracy theories makes it particularly chal-
lenging to develop structural coding categories. For instance, different conspiratorial
narratives can overlap or mutually link to various “tent theories”, which cover a range
of conspiracy theories. Thus, to identify and build connections between different nar-
ratives it is essential to be familiar with existing conspiracy theories, especially their
relationship and terminologies.
To develop a codebook for content analysis, one expert coder with expertise in
conspiracy theories on dark platforms inductively inspected and annotated randomly
sampled posts from both platforms to identify the common themes appearing in the
datasets. When reaching the saturation point2 (Charmaz 2014) after annotating 400
posts, two non-conspiracy theory themes (news updates on COVID-19 and medical
information) and four general conspiracy theory themes were identified. The four con-
spiracy theories theme categories with their 11 subcategories are explained with
examples in Table 1.
Because conspiracy theory themes are non-mutually exclusive, each post can be
assigned multiple categories or subcategories, as appropriate. For instance, the Gab
post shown in Figure 1 claims that the virus was made by Bill Gates, and that he
teamed up with Elon Musk to develop a COVID-19 vaccine and to roll out 5G satellites.
This example includes three conspiracy theory themes: bio-engineering, 5G, and vac-
cination. Two independent coders were assigned to analyse 900 randomly sampled
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Table 1. COVID-19-related conspiracy theories with example posts.
Subcategory Example post
Hoax COVID-19 pandemic is
an anti-Trump plot
Governors sent COVID patients to nursing homes in violation of federal
guidelines, to increase the death count, prolong the "epidemic," and
justify draconian measures in an attempt to derail 2020 election.
…more evidence that the coronavirus is nothing but a politically
motivated hoax, designed to deliberately tank the stock market, and
keep Trump from re-election? Look no further than this lying liberal




… this isn’t about a cold virus. This is about collapsing the economic
structure, cashless society, ID chips, mandatory vaccines, 5G, social
credit systems, all linked into technology controlled by the
government. #CoronaHoax
#COVID is not a killer. #Lockdown is political move towards #New
#World #Order.
General claims that the
severity of the virus is
exaggerated
Hoax. It’s a common virus and we’re seeing a new strain that’s coupled
with possible SARS symptoms…
CORONAVIRUS HOAXERS CAUGHT IN THE ACT. Coronavirus test sites
lying about huge line-ups of people waiting to be tested.
5G 5G assists or activates
the spread the
COVID-19
He [Trump] knows that it’s [corona virus] AI-assisted. He knows that it’s
5G-assisted, COVID-19 19 virus is artificial intelligence assisted.
5G towers actually open up people’s cells to receive viruses, which
would explain why Wuhan, China, which went live with 5G late last
year, became the epicentre of the outbreak.
5G caused sickness and
deaths are taken as
COVID-19 cases
Dr CHARLES LIEBER created the Wuhan Corona virus and developed the
Bioelectric Nanotech that enters human cells to respond to 5G. Both
have the Same Symptoms, so 5G deaths can be falsely blamed on the
Flu-like Coronavirus.
Note that coronavirus patients are already being observed with
neuropsychiatric effects, testicular damage and oxidative stress, three
of the symptoms of 5G exposure.
Bio-Engineered COVID-19 is a bio-
weapon developed
by China
Bart Sibrel … has a theory that Covid-19 was an accidental bio-
weapon released.





The Wuhan coronavirus pandemic is an unusually premeditated
depopulation event directed at China via a race-specific bio-weapon
similar to previous bioterrorist attacks against the Chinese such as the
2002 SARS outbreak.
Depopulation, authoritarian government and elimination of the elderly
who no longer contribute tax money… The coronavirus pandemic is
currently on track to infect 60%–80% of the world’s population and
kill up to 15% of those infected.
Vaccination COVID-19 pandemic is
part of a mass-
vaccination plot by big
pharma to make
huge profits
Several key advisors who urged WHO to declare a pandemic received
direct financial compensation from the very same vaccine
manufacturers who received a windfall of profits from the pandemic
announcement.
How One of Big Pharma’s Most Corrupt Companies Plans to Corner the
COVID-19 Cure Market… . vaccine companies in the United States, is





The #DeepState is hoping to get the #sheeple to show up at the local
#Walmart to get #vaccinated and #MicroChipped in exchange for
receiving ’#DigitalWallets’.
The Gates Foundation and their partners in Big Pharma wait in the
wings with their offering of the ID2020 Alliance and its goal to




#DepopulationGoals preponderance of the evidence: #BillGates: Develops
Covid19 in his lab.
Depopulation-via-vaccines enthusiast Bill Gates claiming you would need




People who have had flu shots (elderly are probably the highest
population to receive flu shots) would ironically be the most
vulnerable. Chinese population is probably heavily vaccinated…
Pentagon Study shows Flu Shot Raises Risk of Coronavirus by 36%, and
there’s more…
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posts. For a rigour check, a 10% random subsample was used for double coding. As
calculated with Cohen’s Kappa, the average inter-coder reliability was .73.
User Profile Analysis
User profile analysis was only conducted with Gab because 8kun users are anonymous
and no profile data was available for us to conduct an analysis directly. In total, 2097
unique profiles are included in our Gab dataset. The user analysis serves to understand
(1) the general characteristics of Gab users participating in the COVID-19 discussion
and (2) who the influential actors are.
To achieve the first objective, 200 randomly sampled user profiles were manually
coded by two trained coders. Building upon prior literature on Gab (Kalmar, Stevens,
and Worby 2018; Zannettou et al. 2017; Zhou et al. 2019), the coding scheme includes
three user dimensions: if the user profile is conspiracy theory-focussed, if it is conser-
vative politics-focussed, and the self-reported location of the user. The coders were
asked to analyse each profile description, the first page of the timelines, the pinned
posts, and the images used. Coding was carried out by two trained research assistants.
The average inter-coding reliability across these three dimensions was .69, as calcu-
lated using Cohen’s Kappa.
For the second task, we conducted an in-depth qualitative profile analysis of the
key actors. These actors were selected using three user metrics: follower count, repost
count, and posting frequency. The distribution of posting frequency and repost count
is shown in the scatter plot presented in Figure 2. Each point in the scatter-plot corre-
sponds to a user profile, and it is sized according to the number of followers. Using
these three metrics (0.99 quartile as the threshold), we identified the most followed,
most active, and most reposted accounts in the dataset for the in-depth qualitative
analysis. In total, 51 profiles were selected. To build detailed descriptive and inform-
ative profiles of these actors, two researchers conducted a multi-source and cross-plat-
form investigation of each actor’s presence in the media and their social media
Figure 1. Screenshot of an example of a Gab post promoting multiple conspiracy theories.
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activities. Information collected and used for depicting these actors was recorded in
detailed fieldnotes. Our examination of these selected actors is qualitative interpret-
ation, and its rigour cannot be assessed by inter-coder reliability (Braun and Clarke
2013; Krippendorff 2004). Instead, the validity of our findings was ensured through in-
depth engagement with available data we assembled and through the two research-
ers’ detailed collaborative interpretation of these data (Yardley 2008).
Domain Analysis
To answer the third research question, we conducted a domain analysis for the exter-
nal sources cited in two datasets. Overall, 53.9% (N¼ 16,455) of the COVID-19-related
posts from 8kun and 81.44% (N¼ 24,503) of the Gab posts contain URLs linking users
to external sources.
The domain data preparation consists of three main steps. First, we extracted all
the URLs in both the Gab and 8kun corpora. In total, 17,248 and 22,128 links were
extracted from 8kun and Gab respectively. In the second step, we recovered URLs that
had been shortened using URL shortener tools. In the third step, all URLs were aggre-
gated to the domain-level. In total, we identified 4,189 unique domains from 8kun
and 2,355 from Gab. To identify the most cited sources, frequency analysis of the
domains was conducted.
Moreover, to better understand the constructs of the information ecosystem on
these two platforms, we conducted a network analysis to explore the co-occurring
domains. Two different methods were used to generate the network data. Due to the
length restriction, most gabs contain only one external URL. Therefore, we took an
actor-based approach to construct the connection: an edge was given to two domains
Figure 2. Scatter-plot of user metrics. Coloured actors were selected for profile analysis.
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if they were posted by the same user. In the case of 8kun, because posts are longer
and often include multiple links, we drew an edge between two domains if they
appeared in the same posts. The software program, Gephi, was used to generate
visualizations.
Findings
How Prevalent Are COVID-19-Related Conspiracy Theories on Dark Platforms?
On 8kun and on Gab, as shown in Figure 3, a large percentage of COVID-19-related
content is news updates on the development of the pandemic, including case reports
and government response (8kun ¼ 35%, Gab ¼ 47%). Discussion of medical (false)
information about the virus and its treatments is much more common on 8kun (14%)
than Gab (4%).
Conspiracy theories are featured in 38% and 24% of the COVID-related posts on
8kun and Gab, respectively. As noted in Section 3.3.1 (Table 1), the four most preva-
lent conspiracy theory themes are
 Hoax: conspiracy theories calling the pandemic a hoax, plotted by Democrats to
prevent Trump from getting re-elected, or by globalists to implement a New
World Order.
 5G: conspiracy theories describing either the new coronavirus itself or its spread as
being “5G-assisted”; other theories claim that the 5G signal is the real cause of sick-
ness and death.
Figure 3. Distribution of six types of content on Gab (blue) and 8kun (yellow). The connecting
lines between the dots represent the difference in the prevalence of conspiracy-theory-related con-
tent on the two platforms.
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 Bio-engineered: conspiracy theories claiming that COVID-19 is man-made, either as
a bio-weapon or part of a depopulation scheme.
 Vaccination: conspiracy theories connecting the pandemic with anti-vaccination
narratives. Related theories range from accusing Big Pharma of manipulating the
health crisis to push mass vaccination programmes to claims that the COVID-19
vaccine will be used to implant nanochips.
On both platforms, the most visible conspiracy theory category are claims that the
pandemic is a “hoax”. They are promoted in 14% of the 8kun posts and 7% of the Gab
posts. Another branch of popular conspiracy theories is related to vaccinations, which are
mentioned in 9% of the 8kun posts and 7% of the Gab posts. Different versions of con-
spiracy theories promoting the idea that COVID-19 is bioengineered from a lab are visible
in 8% of the 8kun posts and 5% of the Gab posts. Due to their sheer outlandishness and
connection to the wider anti-5G movement around the globe, 5G-related explanations of
COVID-19 have attracted a lot of media attention. Such theories are also visible in our
data, but they are mentioned in only 2% of the 8kun posts and 1% of the gabs. From
claims that 5G compromises immunity to the theory that COVID-19 is a mono-android
activated by 5G signals, the eccentricity of these assertions vary.
Whereas some conspiratorial narratives about the pandemic are compatible (as
exemplified in Figure 1), theories labelling the health crisis as a ‘hoax’ or a ‘false flag’
attack contradict many other theories. For this reason, in our data we have observed
hoax conspiracy theorists debunking claims that COVID-19 is a bio-weapon or caused
by 5G. In the examples shown in Figure 4, one Gab user debunks 5G and bio-weapon
narratives with new conspiratorial explanations that these theories were proposed to
delegitimise ‘reasonable’ conspiracism.
Who Are the Most Influential Actors?
Content Analysis of the Randomly Sampled Profiles
From the random sample of Gab users, 76% (N¼ 152) of the accounts explicitly propa-
gate conservative and far-right political ideology and 57% (N¼ 114) of the profiles
contain conspiracy theory content, such as QAnon and anti-vaccination rhetoric.
Figure 4. Examples of COVID-deniers refuting the bio-weapon and 5G conspiracy theories.
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Regarding the user’s geo-location, we found that 23% (N¼ 46) of the profiles are explicit
non-US accounts, among which 18% (N¼ 35) are European. From the sample, eight pro-
files were either private profiles or profiles that no longer exist. The categorical compos-
ition of the profiles we analysed is presented in a Sankey Diagram in Figure 5. The
thickness of the curved bands indicates the number of profiles under each subcategory.
Primary Actors
The COVID-19-commenting Gab profiles with the most followers are predominantly con-
spiracy theorists and right-wing activists from the US and the United Kingdom (UK). These
individuals are opinion leaders, most of whom are “in exile” due to the crackdown and
censorship imposed by major social media platforms. Figure 6 shows three examples of
some of the opinion leaders in exile: Alex Jones, Jayda Fransen and Carl Benjamin.
 Alex Jones is a US conspiracy theorist who owns InfoWars, a multimedia website
promoting conspiracy theories and other forms of misinformation. In 2018, Jones
and InfoWars were banned from Twitter, Facebook, AppleStore and other major
digital platforms.
 Jayda Fransen is a former deputy leader of the far-right group Britain First. She was
active in pushing xenophobic and Islamophobic content on Twitter, some of which
was even retweeted by Donald Trump. After Twitter permanently suspended her
profiles for spreading hate speech in late 2017, Fransen moved to Gab. Fransen
labelled the pandemic a hoax on her Gab account.
 Carl Benjamin, who goes by the name, Sargon of Akkad, on social media, is a vlog-
ger and former member of the right-wing, populist UK Independence Party.
Benjamin regularly promotes misogynistic, racist and inflammatory rhetoric, and he
has been banned from platforms, including Twitter and the crowdfunding site
Figure 5. Sankey diagram showing the categorical composition of 200 random Gab profiles.
Note: from left to right, the columns represent the coding dimensions used in the content analysis: political stance,
geo-location and conspiracy theory prevalence, respectively.
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Patreon. Benjamin has over 45,000 followers on Gab. With regards to the pandemic,
he has shared videos mocking the UK government for its perceived over-reaction.
Throughout the pandemic, these accounts have provided regular extreme political
commentary on local governments’ responses to COVID-19, while promoting a host of
conspiracy theories about the virus.
The top 1% (n¼ 21) of the most active profiles in the study alone contribute to
55% of all the content (N¼ 16,738) in the dataset. However, these accounts receive
very little engagement, with an average of 1.4 likes received by each gab. After analy-
sing the user-profile description and the engagement these accounts have with other
Gab profiles3, we found that these profiles are mostly automated accounts set up to
disseminate content from “alternative news” or unreliable news sources. Figure 7
presents three examples of fan bots for NaturalNews, Breitbart and Investment Watch
Blog, respectively. One important feature of the self-declared bots accounts on Gab is
that they are “unofficial” bots, meaning that they are not officially affiliated with the
media outlets they represent. Instead, they were set up by Gab users or the plat-
form itself.
Figure 6. Screenshots of the Gab profiles of Alex Jones, Jayda Fransen and Carl Benjamin.
Figure 7. Screenshots of Gab profiles of unofficial bots.
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Within the COVID-19-related discussion, the most reposted information comes from
US-based Trump supporters (Figure 8). These groups of Gab users are also highly
active posters (some profiles contributed over 1000 posts in the dataset). However,
unlike the fully automated accounts mentioned above, these active users have a much
larger followership and a traceable engagement with other users.
What Are the Key Information Sources Used in the Discussion and Conspiracy
Theorising of COVID-19?
Domain Frequency Analysis
Findings from domain analysis of all COVID-related posts show that, YouTube and
Twitter are among the top three most sourced websites on both Gab and 8kun
(Figure 9). The former appears in 12% (N¼ 3,742) of the 8kun posts and 15%
(N¼ 4,397) of the gabs. Twitter receives particularly high visibility on Gab, where it
was cited in 12% (N¼ 3,652) of the gabs; it was only mentioned in 6% of the 8kun
posts (N¼ 2,501). Another website that appeared regularly on both platforms was the
far-right finance news website, ZeroHedge, which was cited 620 and 770 times on
8kun and Gab, respectively. ZeroHedge is infamous for making controversial commen-
taries on socio-political issues; during the pandemic, its Twitter account was sus-
pended for propagating conspiratorial claims that blamed the Wuhan Institute of
Virology for creating the novel coronavirus.
A comparison of the top domains also revealed disparities in 8kun and Gab users’
information-sharing patterns. On 8kun, external sources are often shared in a more
secretive manner, with the assistance of online storing and archiving tools. Some fre-
quently used examples include docs.google, pastebin.com, scribd.com, mega.nz and
archive.md. Unsurprisingly, QAnon-related sources are particularly popular in our 8kun
dataset, and some of the most cited Q-themed websites are wearethene.ws and
qnotables.com.
Figure 8. Example of Trump supporters. Username and profile pictures are removed.
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In contrast, Gab users who shared more far-right “fake news” websites are relatively
more visible on Gab. Some of the most cited sources under this category include the
Unhived Mind (N¼ 2,729), Epoch Times (N¼ 1,303), Natural News (N¼ 1,301), Breitbart
(N¼ 769), the Gateway Pundit (N¼ 422), and InfoWars (N¼ 656).
When breaking down the domain frequency by conspiracy theory themes, YouTube
is the most frequently cited source across all four categories (Table 2). For instance, on
the topics of vaccination and bioengineer over 10% of the posts from 8kun and Gab
include YouTube videos. Video content from the dark equivalents of YouTube, such as
bitchute.com and banned.video, was also regularly mentioned in the discussion of
these conspiracy theories.
Domain Network Analysis
To identify the co-occurring domain clusters, we used Blondel et al. (2008) algorithm
to identify high modularity partitions, with the default modularity resolution of 1.
Based on the modularity class, different colours were used to differentiate the top six
clusters identified by this algorithm (Figure 10). The diagrams include the top six clus-
ters from each network that include over 2% of the nodes. Through qualitative
Figure 9. Bar charts comparing the most cited domains on 8kun and Gab.
Table 2. Ten most cited sources for each conspiracy theme.
5G Hoax Bioengineer Vaccination
1 Source % Source % Source % Source %
2 YouTube 7.10 YouTube 6.80 YouTube 10.50 YouTube 10.60
3 Twitter 6.10 Twitter 5.00 The Unhived Mind 9.60 Twitter 6.40
4 videos.utahgunexchange 3.60 pastebin 2.50 InfoWars 5.80 Natural News 3.60
5 InfoWars 2.60 mega.nz 1.90 Twitter 4.40 InfoWars 3.60
6 BitChute 1.40 Natural News 1.30 pastebin 4.10 BitChute 2.50
7 wearethene.ws 1.20 docs.google 1.20 mega.nz 2.70 archive.is 1.80
8 Qnotables 1.10 addons.mozilla.org 1.20 Natural News 2.70 news18 1.80
9 banned.video 0.90 BitChute 1.10 news18 2.40 ZeroHedge 1.70
10 ncbi.nlm.nih.gov 0.70 wearethene.ws 1.00 ZeroHedge 2.00 pastebin 1.30
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inspection of notes with the highest centrality rank in each cluster, we distinguished
and labelled each cluster by the most common types of domains (Table 3).
Figure 10 was generated in Gephi with a ForceAtals2 layout, with visual optimiza-
tion using strong gravity. Modularity classes were used as the nodes partition param-
eter for colouring. Modularity is a scalar value measuring the quality of the partitions
by comparing the density of the links from inside the module (domain clusters in this
case) with that in a random network structure (Newman 2006).
Figure 10. Networks of co-occurring domains on 8kun (a) and Gab (b). For the sake of readability
of the graph, only six clusters from each network with the most nodes are included.
Table 3. Major clusters of the two domain networks.
Modularity
class Label Example Nodes
Avg
degrees




foxnews.com, bbc.uk 1,612 17.45
Mk18 Regional
newspapers
detroitnews.com, startribune.com 621 22.22
Mk33 Business news markets.businessinsider.com,
businessworld.in
91 15.65
Mk14 Government michigan.gov, gov.louisiana.gov 86 23.68
Mk01 File sharing docs.google.com, mega.nz 66 14.73
Mk00 Video streaming vimeo.com, streamable.com 63 10.8









cdc.org, sciencemag.org 225 246.13
Mg09 International
news outlets
theguardian.com, bbc.com 221 103.59
Mg01 US legacy
news outlets
bloomberg.com, wsj.com 162 127.33
Mg05 Conspiracy
theory outlets
naturalnews.com, pandemic.news 124 94.12
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Unlike frequency domain analysis, which indicates that the most cited sources on
Gab and 8kun are social media and alternative news/conspiracy theory sites, the
domain network provides a broader picture of the information ecosystem. Despite the
dark nature of Gab and 8kun and the prevalence of conspiracy theories on these plat-
forms, mainstream news outlets are very prevalent in both networks. Some of the
regularly cited sources include reuters.com, bbc.com and theguardian.com. Moreover,
on both platforms, the cluster of official information sources from governmental and
science institutions (Mk14, Mg03) have the highest average degree of centrality.
Within these clusters, WHO, CDC and prestigious scientific publications (e.g. thelancet.-
com and sciencemag.org) are among the most cited sources.
Discussion
Hotbed of Conspiracy Theories
Although similar studies have shown that false claims about COVID-19 are also highly
visible on major social media platforms (e.g. Evanega et al. 2020, Kouzy et al. 2020),
the profusion of deceptive information, especially conspiracy theories, is much greater
on 8kun and Gab. When comparing Gab and 8kun, we found that the latter propa-
gates more conspiracy theories. The higher visibility of conspiracy theories on 8kun
should be interpreted in relation to its platform affordance and platform culture. As
mentioned before, 8kun let users publish contents anonymously. This anonymity,
coupled with minimal content governance, has encouraged the prevalence of toxic
content, including conspiracy theories. When it comes to Gab, the microblogging ser-
vice presents itself as the censorship-free alternative to Twitter, which is largely used
as a “broadcasting” tool for sharing news and information. This explains why almost
half the COVID-related posts were updates about the development of the pandemic.
Unlike 8kun wherein lengthy posts are a common occurrence, Gab’s short format also
limits its potential to serve as a locale for elaborating conspiracy theories.
Conspiracy theories proliferating during a pandemic is neither new nor surprising.
COVID-related conspiracy themes identified in this study reveals the particular social
and political functions of conspiracy theories during public health crises. As previously
mentioned, conspiracy theories function as a threat management response and a
sense-making mechanism, these tendencies make health crises particularly susceptible
to conspiracism (Van Prooijen and Jostmann 2013). In the absence of a conclusive
explanation of COVID-19’s origin, prevention and cure, conspiracy theories emerged to
fill the epistemic gap. Furthermore, the recent rise of populism has fuelled the
weaponization of conspiracy theories to delegitimise established political powers and
science communities (Mede and Sch€afer 2020). For instance, the popularity of theories
claiming that the pandemic is a hoax and that the virus is bio-weapon from China
should be interpreted in relation to populism in the US, where most Gab and 8kun
users are based. As previously mentioned, Trump supporters are prominent actors par-
ticipating in COVID-related discussion on dark platforms. Their rhetoric around the
pandemic was in large part shaped by the 2020US presidential election and the Sino-
US trade war. Some, for example, promoted claims that China staged the health crisis
in order to manipulate the trade war against the US; others claimed that the US
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Democratic party and their “fake news” media allies have consistently exaggerated the
severity of the virus in an attempt undermine Trump’s Presidency. While attempts to
explain crises through scapegoating “the other” (Democrats and China) is a common
response to crisis (Bordia and DiFonzo 2005), throughout the COVID-19 health crisis,
such rhetoric is also being used to advance political agendas.
Dark Participants
As mentioned earlier in this article, conspiracy theorizing in the digital environment
can be perceived as a form of dark participation, wherein individuals collectively make
sense of perceived threats and uncertainties. Users of 8kun and Gab, as shown in the
example of COVID-related discussion, performed intellectual labour to collaboratively
curate information from a wide variety of sources to formulate explanations about the
pandemic. Although our user profile analysis showed that these participants are
largely homogenous and overwhelmingly conservative-leaning, we should not depict
conspiracy theorists as a monolithic group of people. Our findings not only revealed
the wide geographical distribution of users (on Gab) but also illustrates contestations
between conspiracy theorists. For example, theories denying the seriousness or exist-
ence of COVID-19 are the most popular category identified in our study, however,
they also routinely contradict one another and other COVID-19 conspiracies. As dis-
cussed earlier, many of those who declared the pandemic “a hoax” also participated in
debunking 5G and bio-weapon theories.
Where influential actors are concerned, there are big disparities between dark plat-
forms and major social media. Related studies on Twitter and Facebook suggest that
(alternative) media accounts played a crucial role in spreading false claims about
COVID-19 (Yang et al. 2020). On dark platforms, the presence of such accounts is
largely absent. Our analysis of primary actors on Gab identified numerous “dark influ-
encers” who have been suspended by Facebook and Twitter, many of whom are con-
spiracy entrepreneurs (Sunstein and Vermeule 2009, 212) who profit from and monetize
their visibility on social media. After being banned by major platforms, dark platforms
provide refuge to these conspiracy theories, and in return they facilitate dark plat-
forms’ recruitment of new members. Moreover, these actors use their exiled status to
gain credibility on dark platforms. From Alex Jones’s self-marketing as “the most
banned person on Internet”, to Jayda Fransen’s “purged from Twitter 18/12/2017” dec-
laration (Figure 6), it has become customary for conspiracy theorists and far-right acti-
vists to use their “pariah” status as a form self-branding.
While attention and profit-seeking conspiracy entrepreneurs prevail on Gab,
anonymous conspiracy theorists on 8kun remain largely mysterious. One characteristic
of their participation in constructing conspiratorial explanations of the pandemic is
their high degree of coordination. 8kun users included in this study, or Anons, collab-
oratively construct conspiracy theories about COVID-19 based upon messages from Q
(or “Q drops”). Using Anon’s own language, this process of assembling information
into coherent conspiracy narratives is called “baking” (Zuckerman 2019). “Bakers” have
to follow standardized forms of communication in the community, and detailed
instructions are regularly shared on 8kun to teach new Anons how to properly “bake”.
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This degree of formality and standardization provide a high threshold for newcomers,
preventing dark participation in this online locale from going mainstream. To a large
extent, the participation in conspiracy theorizing on 8kun remains largely a form of
subculture, or a cultic milieu (Campbell 2002 [1972]). Despite their fringe nature, the
impacts of such conspiratorial cultic milieus on 8kun and other anonymous forums
should not be overlooked. On these platforms, conspiracism is closely interlinked with
a further-reaching and more visible toxic culture that promotes extremism, hatred and
violence. For example, following the 2020US presidential election, claims declaring the
results as “rigged” flourished on 8kun and many members subscribing to these theo-
ries then used the platform to mobilize and plan for the subsequent storming of the
US Capitol building(Collins and Zadrozny 2021).
Parallel Information Ecosystem
When compared to findings from studies examining the sources of COVID-related
information on mainstream popular social media sites (Cinelli, Quattrociocchi, and
Galeazzi 2020; Yang et al. 2020), our study shows that low-credibility sources are
much more prevalent on dark platforms. Moreover, results from our domains analysis
revealed a “darker” information ecosystem that runs parallel to more established and
authoritative information sources. To circumvent censorship on major platforms, 8kun
and Gab participants use under-the-radar tools to share information. For instance,
rather than YouTube, “dark equivalents” (e.g. BitChute.com) can be used to dissemin-
ate controversial videos. Likewise, rather than citing online posts/articles directly,
archiving portals or pastebin sites were deployed to bypass censorship and maintain
anonymity. Despite the existence of a parallel darker information ecosystem, dark plat-
forms are not free from the influence of their mainstream counterparts. As shown in
our domain network analysis, Gab and 8kun and their mainstream counterparts are
interlinked. Both major social media sites (Twitter and YouTube) and legacy media are
regularly cited by Gab and 8kun users. These findings provide important insights into
the media diets of dark platform users. The prevalence of legacy and authoritative
information sources provide evidence to support Bruns (2019) critique on filter bub-
bles. As Bruns (2019) argued, participants on a given platform may form highly homo-
philous communities, but at the same time they remain embedded in the hybrid
media ecology and encounter a broad range of information.
To acknowledge dark participants’ engagement with broad media ecology is par-
ticularly informative for our understanding of conspiracy theory epistemology.
Sunstein and Vermeule (2009, 204) attributed conspiracy theories to the so-called
“crippled epistemology”, which they argued is a result of a “sharply limited number of
(relevant) informational sources”. In a similar vein, Barkun (2013, 8) argued that con-
spiracy theorists dismiss mainstream media sources to avoid the “mind control and
brainwashing used to deceive the majority”. In contrast to their observations, the cur-
rent study reveals the consumption of a wide range of media sources, including legacy
media reports and scientific publications. This implies that the interplay between con-
spiracy theories and authoritative narratives is dynamic and complex. As Munn (2019)
stated, for conspiracy theorists to achieve intellectual legitimacy, they also have to
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actively engage with authoritative and scientific narratives. To better understand how
these narratives could be utilized, or hijacked, to support conspiracism, future research
should examine the context of conspiracy theorists’ citing of authoritative sources.
Furthermore, as mainstream social media sites tighten their platform governance,
an increasing number of controversial figures and their followers will be forced into
the darker spectrum. For example, while this article was being written, Donald Trump,
who has been permanently banned from Twitter and Facebook is reportedly attempt-
ing to crawl his way back onto social media through dark platforms (Brown 2021).
Alongside joining existing social media platforms, another growing trend is for these
personnel in exile to retreat into closed communication, such as through re-deploying
old-fashioned mailing lists or developing their own apps. These trends further divide
and polarize the online space, dispersing conspiracy theorists into fragmented online
locales. In the context of conspiracy theories, experiences of ostracism could make
people more likely to hold conspiracy beliefs (Graeupner and Coman 2017), and at the
same time render the already challenging task of refuting them even more difficult.
Future studies should empirically evaluate the impacts of this trend. Although the cur-
rent study exclusively examined Gab and 8kun, dark platform as a concept can be
used as a heuristic device for researching a wider range of under-the-radar platforms.
Notes
1. QResearch retrieve posts based on keyword detection, so we can use the term ‘covid’ to
retrieve data related to the study. In contrast, garc’s hashtag search function returns post
with exact hashtags. For this reason, we could not use the same term – “covid” – to collect
Gab posts.
2. This refers to the point when new data does not yield new observations or insights—in our
case thematic categories.
3. The Comments section in Gab profiles allows us to inspect the users’ interactions with
others. In addition to content type, profile description and posting frequencies, we used the
(lack of) engagement to assess how likely it is that the profile is automated.
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